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ABSTRACT
While the literature on democratic backsliding has not yet systematically investigated
how civil society influences backsliding processes, it generally assumes that civil
society organizations (CSOs) act as a counter to democratic backsliding. This article
contests this assumption by showing that, despite all three countries having vibrant
civil societies, CSOs have so far failed to counter democratic backsliding in
Bangladesh, Thailand and the Philippines. It argues that in weakly institutionalized
democracies, CSOs are easily captured by political elites, a condition that brings
their undemocratic potential to the fore.
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The literature on democratic backsliding is largely unanimous in considering the repression
of civil society an important expression of democratic backsliding,1 defined as “a deterio-
ration of qualities associated with democratic governance, within any regime”.2 However,
the question of how civil society influences democratic-backsliding processes has barely
been investigated systematically as of yet. The existing research largely assumes that civil
society acts as a counter to democratic backsliding. Tusalem, for instance, finds that civil
society stabilizes Third-Wave democracies, protecting them from breakdown.3 Similarly,
Bermeo argues that, “[w]hen civil society is allowed some space, countermobilization
[against democratic backsliding] can occur” and that the government attacks on “associa-
tional life” currentlyunderway inbacksliding regimesonly reflect the respective incumbents’
memories of the civil society-based mass mobilizations that ousted authoritarian regimes
during the Third Wave.4 This positive view resonates with democratic transition theory5
andnormative democratic approaches to civil society,6 which generally viewCSOs as cham-
pions of democracy. Contrariwise, critical studies have argued that, in the absence of strong
democratic state institutions, civil society mobilization often promotes democratic decline
rather than stability.7 Similarly, research on the dark sides of civil society8 casts general
doubts on the democratic potential of CSOs, stressing that they can resort to undemocratic
tactics, be internally hierarchical or be involved in clientelistic networks.9
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To disentangle these conflicting views, this article investigates the role of civil
society in the democratic-backsliding processes undergone by Bangladesh, Thailand
and the Philippines. The three cases reflect the tremendous heterogeneity of Asia,
being dissimilar in terms of their colonial legacies (or lack thereof), political
systems, ethnic compositions, majority religions and important economic factors.
Nevertheless, Bangladesh, Thailand and the Philippines exhibit three striking simi-
larities: first, all three countries have recently experienced severe democratic backslid-
ing, which resulted in democratic breakdowns in Thailand and Bangladesh in 2014 and
2019 respectively10; second, prior to the current backsliding processes, all three consti-
tuted “weak democracies”11 in which democratic state institutions had long been cap-
tured by political elites,12 and, accordingly, all had experienced earlier episodes of
backsliding13; and, third, the three countries all pose the same puzzle regarding the
relationship between civil society and the development of democracy. Bangladesh,
Thailand and the Philippines all democratized during the Third Wave with civil
society mobilization playing a crucial role in the downfall of their former authoritarian
regimes14; all three countries have long had vibrant civil societies. Nevertheless, in all
three cases, civil society has so far failed to act as an effective counter to democratic
backsliding. Based on an analysis of the structure of civil society and the role played
by CSOs in the respective countries’ incumbent backsliding regimes, this article
argues that this is largely because civil society in Bangladesh, Thailand and the Philip-
pines has long been captured by political elites.
Asian civil society, political elites and democratic backsliding in weak
democracies
DominantWestern conceptions of civil society rely predominantly on de Tocqueville15
who postulated a direct connection between voluntary associations and democracy.16
According to the neo-Tocquevillian view, the associational sphere of civil society pro-
tects citizens from undue state interference and generates values, such as trust and tol-
erance, that sustain liberal democracy.17 Contrary to this, Gramscian approaches
conceptualize civil society as an area of contestation over cultural and ideological hege-
mony. While Gramsci himself was concerned with the hegemony of the (bourgeois)
ruling class over civil society,18 neo-Gramscians often view civil society positively as
an area of counter-hegemonic struggle.19 According to Alagappa, national civil
societies in Asia display both “neo-Tocquevillian and neo-Gramscian” features.20
Drawing from Alagappa, this study views civil society as “a realm in the interstices
of the state, political society, the market, and the society at large for organization by
nonstate, nonmarket groups that take collective action in the pursuit of the public
good”,21 whereby “public good” refers to the interests of particular CSOs rather
than of society at large.22 Civil society thus constitutes a “realm of power, inequality,
struggle and conflict among competing interests”,23 which also comprises “anti-demo-
cratic” actors.24 Similarly, Ogawa notes that “civil societies in Asia may also include
social interests that are highly politically exclusionary and illiberal”,25 while Guan
finds that Western definitions often “downplay the internal conflict character of
civil society”26 and that civil society’s impact on democracy in South East Asia (to
which Thailand and the Philippines belong) varies.27
While civil society is analytically distinct from the state, the economy and political
society, in reality the boundaries are blurred.28 According to Alagappa, “co-optation
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and control” by the state “limi[t] the democratic potential of associations”.29 Specifi-
cally, while not all CSOs are democratic themselves, a lack of autonomy curtails
their ability to act as democratic watchdogs by ensuring accountability30 and control-
ling the power abuses of political elites.31
Against this backdrop, what is the role of civil society in democratic backsliding in
Asia? According to Croissant and Haynes, “democratic backsliding in Asia is mainly
[…] a feature of weak democracies”.32 This is in line with the more general finding
of Waldner and Lust that “weakly instituted democracies […] are vulnerable to back-
sliding”.33 Similarly, Haggard and Kaufman argue that ostensibly different forms of
democratic reversion often have “common causal roots in the weak democracy syn-
drome”,34 defined as a combination of “praetorianism, weak institutionalization,
and poor economic performance”.35 Drawing on Croissant, Bangladesh, Thailand
and the Philippines can be seen as having a history of military intervention in politics
(praetorianism) and weak institutionalization.36
According to Haggard and Kauffmann, weak institutionalization prompts both
incumbents and opposition leaders to resort to extra-constitutional tactics, while prae-
torianism encourages both actor groups to seek support from the military.37 Similarly,
much of the literature on democratic backsliding stresses that executive aggrandize-
ment and other political elite actions play a direct causal role in backsliding.38 Specifi-
cally, Dimitrova shows that democratic backsliding often constitutes the “outcome of
processes of state capture by rent-seeking elites”.39 This assessment is relevant for Ban-
gladesh, Thailand and the Philippines, where key democratic state institutions, includ-
ing the electoral process, have long been captured by political elites.40 Similarly,
Arugay and Sinpeng note that in South East Asian democracies, democratization
“reached the glass ceiling allowed by its ruling elite”41, with voters often “forced to
choose from […] unresponsive cliques of political elites”.42 Drawing on Asseburg
and Wimmen, this article views political elites as actors “who yield significant
influence over the political process” during political transformations that may lead
to either more democracy or increasing authoritarianism.43 Thus, political elites can
include well-established, traditional political elites, military leaders and/or populists
who are political newcomers.
Medina-Guce and Galindes argue that the elite political settlements that underlie
democratic state institutions in backsliding regimes shape the space available for
CSOs.44 Horner and Puddephatt show that in Asia the democratic space in which
civil society operates is often co-opted by political elites, while democratic state insti-
tutions frequently lack autonomy, being controlled by elite camps that may either have
been dominating the polity for a long time or compete for dominance with other such
camps.45 Thus, the autonomy of civil society is likely to be circumscribed in weak
democracies undergoing backsliding, a condition that limits its democratic potential.
In particular, the political elite camps that control democratic institutions in backslid-
ing regimes are often “rent-seeking coalitions”46 that interact with citizens through cli-
entelistic exchanges47; the literature on the dark sides of civil society suggests that
CSOs can form part of such clientelist chains.48
Civil society’s lack of autonomy is likely to be greatest in contexts of intense polar-
ization between political elites, which constitutes an important driver of democratic
backsliding.49 While polarization is not necessarily ideological, it promotes the “devel-
opment of rigid and antagonistic political entities”50 and leads citizens “to trade off
democratic principles for partisan interests”.51 This pattern is bound to be relevant
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for CSOs as well. Undemocratic incumbents in backsliding regimes are often elected,52
and may thus have significant popular support. Consequently, they may enjoy some
popularity among CSOs as well. Conversely, CSOs may affiliate themselves with oppo-
sitional elites. However, embattled opposition leaders in backsliding regimes often
employ undemocratic tactics themselves,53 a tendency that negatively affects their
civil society supporters. In contexts of severe elite competition, civil society is
usually fragmented, and mirrors conflicts at the elite level, rather than constituting
an independent and alternative social force.54
To analyse the prospects of democratic backsliding, Waldner and Lust propose a
“balance-of-power framework” focussing on shifts in the power relations between
pro- and anti-democratic political coalitions.55 Thereby, the relative power of each
coalition (led by political elites) also depends on “the relative sizes of the[ir] constitu-
encies”.56 Accordingly, CSOs can either reinforce pro-democratic political coalitions,
thereby countering democratic backsliding, or align themselves with anti-democratic
political camps, thereby contributing to backsliding processes.
Bangladesh
Following the “‘people power’ movement”57 that brought down the military regime of
Ershad in 1990, democratic state institutions in Bangladesh remained weak, owing to
“pernicious” ideological polarization58 between the country’s two main parties: the
Awami League (AL) and the Bangladesh Nationalist Party (BNP). While the AL, led
by Sheikh Hasina, advocates secular “Bengali nationalism”, grounded in the country’s
ethnolinguistic Bengali identity, the BNP, led by Khaleda Zia, promotes “Bangladeshi
nationalism”, emphasizing the nation’s Islamic character. Between 1991 and 2006,
both parties displayed “authoritarian tendencies”, politicizing the bureaucracy, the
judiciary and the security apparatus whenever in power.59
According to Rahman, ideological polarization in Bangladesh is “elite-driven” – as
both parties have constituencies that cut across social classes and use the national-
identity cleavage strategically to counter electoral volatility.60 “[P]olarizing narratives”
employed by party elites “prepared the ground for polarized civil society movements
that feed on divisive nationalist narratives”, while partisan “civil societies in turn
exacerbate and sharpen the existing divide”.61 Both parties maintain civil society-
based front organizations, such as the Chattra League (CL) and the Chattra Dal
(CD) – the AL’s and the BNP’s respective student wings.62 Foreign-funded NGOs
are largely depoliticized and service-oriented and often constitute job machines for
the educated middle class.63 Nevertheless, many NGOs have informally aligned them-
selves with the AL or the BNP.64 Concurrently, vicious party politics and the partisan
co-optation of civil society have prompted many Bangladeshis, middle-class citizens
included, to advocate apolitical approaches to development and to come to view poli-
tics as illegitimate.65
Following attempts by the then BNP-led government to rig the 2006 elections,
massive street battles between AL and BNP supporters led to a promissory coup in
January 2007, marking Bangladesh’s first episode of democratic backsliding.66 Signifi-
cant sections of the middle class supported the coup,67 while several non-party-parti-
san CSOs collaborated with the military-backed Caretaker Government (CTG) that
ruled from 2007 to 2008. For instance, some civil society leaders held positions
within the CTG, while Transparency International Bangladesh (TIB) provided input
84 J. LORCH
into the CTG’s anti-corruption agenda. Microcredit pioneer Muhammad Yunus
founded a political party and publicly praised the CTG’s reform efforts.68
In December 2008, the CTG held elections that the AL won. Collaboration between
the AL and the military increased, with the Directorate General of Forces Intelligence
(DGFI) – Bangladesh’s main military intelligence agency – assuming a key role in pol-
itical decision-making,69 further weakening democratic institutional foundations.
Initially, several CSOs and “eminent citizens” –meaning prominent civil society intel-
lectuals – supported the AL government and enjoyed influence under it.70 In particu-
lar, this included CSOs who were politically loyal to the AL or maintained personal
relations with AL leaders. For instance, the National Human Rights Commission
was revamped, with eminent citizens being appointed to key posts.71 Since assuming
power, however, the AL has fiercely pursued civil society actors who supported the
CTG, ousting, for instance, Yunus as head of Grameen Bank.72
In 2010, the AL established the International Crimes Tribunal (ICT) to try the war
crimes committed by Islamist militias during the War of Independence, a move that
secular CSOs supported strongly.73 However, contestation over the Tribunal enhanced
ideological polarization and reinforced the AL’s authoritarian inclinations.74 After a
2013 standoff between the pro-secular Shahbag movement, which the AL soon tried to
co-opt, and the Islamist Hefazat movement, which was courted by the BNP,75 the AL
pressed ahead with holding the 2014 elections under its own administration rather
than a non-partisan interim government as demanded by the BNP. Consequently, the
latter boycotted the polls and repression against the opposition increased. The 2019 elec-
tions were deeply flawed, with the AL’s alliance bagging 288 out of 300 seats.
Conflict over the Tribunal also enhanced polarization among originally more inde-
pendent CSOs. In 2014, the ICT convicted the journalist David Bergman, who had cri-
ticized the Tribunal, of contempt. Sixty civil society representatives denounced
Bergman’s trial. However, many CSOs refused to support them, with some joining
the AL in accusing the “group of 60” and other government critics of working
against secularism.76
From 2014 to 2016, the AL government revised the Foreign Donations (Voluntary
Activities) Regulation Ordinance (FDRO) that regulates foreign-funded NGOs.
Initially, NGOs were involved through consultation, a process facilitated by the
good personal relations many NGO leaders maintained with the AL lawmaker Suranjit
Sengupta who headed the parliamentary committee in charge of amending the ordi-
nance.77 However, in 2015, TIB, which participated in the consultations, published
the study “Parliament Watch” that criticized corruption in parliament. Moreover,
TIB’s Executive Director, Iftekharruzzaman, stated publicly that parliament had
become a puppet show. Leading AL lawmakers rejected the statement, terming it
proof that TIB was beholden to the BNP and foreign donors.78 Apparently referring
to TIB’s role during the CTG, Agricultural Minister Matia Chowdhury stated that
“[y]ou [TIB] don’t speak when the martial law comes. This government is not loyal
to the foreigners. You are”.79
While this illustrated the AL’s increasing readiness to equate NGO engagement
with foreign interference, Iftekharruzzaman’s statement also showed that some non-
party-partisan NGO leaders overestimated their strength. Following the controversy,
Sengupta rejected most NGO demands despite having initially been open to many
of them.80 The final version of the FDRO, passed in 2016, grants the government
extensive leeway to deregister critical NGOs and terminate their foreign funding.81
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Furthermore, some AL parliamentarians have alleged being informed by the intelli-
gence services that, from 2007 to 2008, the CTG used information collected by TIB
in its hard-handed anti-corruption drive against influential party politicians and
that other NGOs involved with the CTG likewise provided the latter with information
with which to punish corrupt politicians.82
Since 2016, the AL government has increasingly cracked down on CSOs.83 While it
has tolerated service delivery by NGOs, it has heavily curtailed the latter’s involvement
in policymaking, largely reducing them to “complementary and supplementary
bod[ies] to the government”.84 Human rights CSOs, such as Ain o Salish Kendro85
and Odhikar,86 continue to document human rights abuses committed by government
agencies. Similarly, Sammilito Samajik Andolan – a network of intellectuals and CSO
leaders originally rather close to the AL – has criticized some of the AL’s authoritarian
practices.87 Sometimes, critical CSOs connect with international organizations, for
instance by engaging with the Universal Periodic Review and other UN reporting
mechanisms.88
However, even eminent citizens once close to the AL have become largely unable to
influence government policy. One lamented, “gradually, we are losing friends in poli-
tics”.89 Moreover, even where CSO leaders have maintained good personal relations
with individual AL ministers and managed to secure the latter’s support for their
initiatives, these initiatives have sometimes still been hampered by the DGFI.90
In July 2018, public outrage over the death of two students in a traffic accident
sparked the “road safety movement”, led by independent students. Activists controlled
streets in Dhaka and other cities, demanding improvements in the transportation
sector, along with broader political reforms.91 When the AL became afraid of the dem-
onstrations snowballing into anti-government protests, it dispersed the movement by
force – with the CL beating up many students and schoolchildren.92 When some CSOs
lamented government repression ahead of the 2019 elections, Prime Minister Hasina
dismissed the criticism – accusing them of being beholden to foreign donors.93
When TIB highlighted irregularities in the electoral process, the AL accused it of
siding with the BNP.94
Some CSOs that were originally pro-AL have begun to reject the party’s growing
authoritarianism.95 Nevertheless, they remain reluctant to mobilize against the AL,
given that they despise the BNP. As an eminent citizen formerly close to the AL argued,
[w]ho would come if the Awami League was not there? BNP. […] We have seen that when BNP
comes back [to power] they come back with [a] more repressive attitude towards people. So I
don’t think that change of government would help […] I blame the other political parties also.
They have not shown any interest in the people’s rights […]. And […] if it’s Tarique Zia
[Khaleda Zia’s son] in place of Hasina that’s even worse.96
Similarly, CSOs once close to the AL often continue to reject cooperation with pro-
BNP CSOs. Showing how much the ideological polarization at the elite level is mir-
rored by civil society, the interviewee stated:
[t]hey [pro-BNP CSOs] cannot really stand up for secular Bangladesh, […] they have no moral
authority to become civil society for Bangladesh. […] [H]ow can you accept them as your
allies? […] [T]hey don’t have anything in common with us.97
In the run-up to the 2019 elections, Kamal Hossain, an eminent citizen and author of
the Bangladeshi constitution once close to Hasina,98 formed the Jatiya Oikya Front
(JOF) as an oppositional electoral coalition. Some CSOs originally aligned with the
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AL welcomed this move as long as they perceived it as the emergence of a third force.
When the JOF adopted the BNP into its ranks, however, such sympathies ended
immediately.99
Thailand
Following the popular demonstrations that triggered the fall of the military regime of
Suchinda Kraprayoon in 1992, Thailand’s newly established democratic system
remained deficient, owing to the continued dominance of traditional bureaucratic,
royalist and military elites giving it an “oligarchic character”.100 Recent processes of
democratic backsliding have been promoted by the intense political polarization
that started during the tenure of Thaksin Shinawatra (2001–2006). According to Kong-
kirati, this polarization has “two layers”: first, the “elite power struggle”101 between the
“royal-military bureaucratic alliance”102 and Thaksin’s camp of rival capitalist elites;
and, second, “mass-based conflict”,103 which involves civil society. While the royal-
military camp advocates “Thai-style democracy” under the auspices of a benevolent
monarch and military, the one around Thaksin promulgates majoritarian “populist
democracy”.104
While middle-class activists supported “elite-driven” democratic reforms in the
1990s,105 some middle-class civil society representatives also initially supported
Thaksin. Several “Octobrists”, former leftist student activists who had opposed military
rule and often joined CSOs later on, contributed to the electoral platform of Thaksin’s
Thai Rak Thai (TRT) party or even joined his administration.106 However, Thaksin
soon repressed NGOs and discredited them publicly for relying on foreign
funding.107 Moreover, Thaksin’s efforts to integrate the poor into capitalist develop-
ment contradicted NGO visions of communitarian democracy and community-
based development.108
In 2006, the People’s Alliance for Democracy (PAD), or Yellow Shirts, demon-
strated for Thaksin’s resignation after attempts to investigate his alleged corruption
excesses had failed.109 The PAD self-identified as a predominantly urban, middle-
class movement and drew significant organizational and financial support from the
middle class.110 It also comprised NGOs, as well as farmers’ and workers’ unions.111
Owing to the significant role that royalist and other traditional political elites played
in its mobilization,112 Kasian termed the PAD a “royalist” movement.113 The PAD’s
demonstrations paved the way for the 2006 military coup, which marked Thailand’s
first episode of democratic breakdown114 and further enhanced political polariz-
ation.115 As seasoned observers have pointed out, the events of 2006 showed the readi-
ness of the traditional royalist elite and its middle-class civil society supporters to
disrespect the “verdict of the electoral majority”116 and remove an elected leader by
force.117
Thaksin’s popular support base remained strong and TRT successor parties con-
tinued to win elections after the end of military rule in 2007. Concurrently, the roy-
alist-military elite controlled key democratic state institutions, as exemplified by the
dissolution of parties linked to Thaksin by the Constitutional Court.118 To legiti-
mate their rule, successive governments run or backed by royalist-military elites
from 2006 to 2014 promoted CSOs promulgating a communitarian discourse on
democracy that resonated with the traditional elites’ vision of “Thai-style democ-
racy”. CSOs for their part seized such opportunities for cooperation to spread
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their communitarian ideology and gain access to development programmes and
state resources.119
The 2006 coup had convinced Thaksin’s political camp that it needed its own mass
movement,120 leading to the emergence of the “Red Shirts”. Political elites of the TRT
successor party Pheu Thai would play an important role herein.121 The Red Shirt
movement comprised diverse civil society actors, including public intellectuals,
artists and ex-leaders of the 1992 pro-democracy movement122 – and would mobilize
against the Democrat Party (DP) and the royal-military establishment.
Starting in 2013, the People’s Democratic Reform Committee (PDRC) protested for
the ousting of Prime Minister Yingluck Shinawatra, the sister of Thaksin. Organized
mainly by DP supporters and urban, middle-class citizens,123 the PDRC was the
PAD’s direct successor. Buddhist monks, religious organizations, academics, NGOs
and trade unions also participated in the movement,124 which campaigned for
“Reform before Election”, advocated for a political system replacing elected represen-
tatives with appointed “moral” leaders125 and repeatedly called for military interven-
tion.126 In 2014, the PDRC launched a violent campaign to sabotage snap elections
called by Yingluck, leading to democratic breakdown through the 2014 military
coup.127 Sinpeng and Arugay conclude, “the middle class in Thailand […] consistently
has undemocratic tendencies and only supports democracy when its interests are not
threatened”.128
The military regime of General Prayut Chan-o-cha (2014–2019) repressed the Pheu
Thai party and drafted a new constitution cementing the political dominance of the
“royal-military power bloc” and providing enhanced powers to unelected insti-
tutions.129 The March 2019 elections, which were marred by interference,130 installed
a quasi-civilian regime; in June 2019, parliament – whose Upper House is appointed by
the military – “elected” Prayut prime minister. Both the military regime and the
current quasi-civilian government of Prayut have heavily restricted the space for
civil society, targeting especially independent CSOs and CSOs close to the Red
Shirts; CSOs associated with the Yellow Shirts have enjoyed much more freedom
meanwhile.131
Following the 2014 coup, the Red Shirts largely disbanded after the decision by its
Pheu Thai-based leadership to keep a low profile so as to avoid repression. Conse-
quently, individual activists parted ways with the movement, linking up with more
independent CSOs and pro-democracy activists. Already under military rule, some
of these new civil society coalitions launched symbolic acts of public defiance;132
some oppositional activists mobilized “‘flash mob’ protests”.133 Moreover, some
CSOs – such as Thai Lawyers for Human Rights – have publicly criticized the
human rights abuses committed by both Prayut governments,134 while other CSOs
have advocated for a return to democratic rule. The Democracy Restoration Group
(DRG) has launched programmes to rebuild popular support for representative
democracy and seeks to promote accountable democratic institutions. In 2018, the
People Who Want Elections Movement, which included the DRG, mobilized via dem-
onstrations to pressure the then military government to stick to its promise of holding
elections in 2019.135
In the run-up to those elections, the DRG and other CSOs participated in the for-
mation of opposition parties, such as Future Forward, led by businessman Thanathorn
Juangroongruangkit, or the Commoners’ Party, which also includes former Yellow
Shirt members – among others, NGOs that turned away from the royalist-military
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elite after the 2014 coup.136 Similarly, many former middle-class supporters of the DP
in Bangkok shifted their allegiance to Future Forward, which criticized the DP for
being “too close to the military”.137 In December 2019, Future Forward mobilized
an anti-government demonstration in Bangkok, which Pheu Thai supported.138 In
January 2020, thousands of people joined a “Run against Dictatorship” organized by
Thanathorn in Bangkok.139 When the Constitutional Court disbanded Future
Forward, student protests erupted on many campuses; young activists have since con-
tinued to demonstrate for democratic reforms.140
Conversely, conservative CSOs have actively participated in the crackdown on oppo-
sitional activism. The Rubbish Collection Organization, founded by the ultra-royalist
former army general Rienthong Nanna, has committed itself to ridding Thailand of
“social rubbish” – launching legal complaints of lèse-majesté against people critical of
the royalist-military elite, bullying them on social media and, at times, threating them
with physical assault.141 Social Sanction, the Network of Volunteer Citizens to Protect
the Monarchy and the Anti-Ignorance Association have likewise villainized oppositional
actors online, branding them “un-Thai” and/or as evil elements linked to the Red
Shirts.142 Similarly, conservative CSOs have labelled foreign-funded NGOs “lackeys”
of the West, while pro-government online activists have claimed that United States-
based donors, including George Soros, are helping the Red Shirts, human rights CSOs
and other oppositional activists to intervene in Thailand’s domestic politics.143
The Philippines
According to Hedman, the “secondary associations” forming the building blocks of the
1986 People Power demonstrations, which ousted the authoritarian Marcos regime,
were closely linked to the Philippines’ Catholic Church and oligarchical capitalist
class.144 Similarly, others have depicted People Power as a movement by the middle
class,145 business tycoons146 and the traditional political elite around later president
Corazon Aquino.147 Accordingly, the 1986 regime change resulted in the establish-
ment of an “elitist and low-intensity democracy”, dominated by the oligarchical
elite.148 Nevertheless, middle-class CSOs149, Church-based groups and leftist CSOs,
including National Democratic (ND) groups sympathetic to the Communist Party
of the Philippines-New People’s Army (CPP-NPA), thrived in the period post-1986.150
The 1998 election of Estrada, who appealed directly to the poor, initiated fierce but
largely non-ideological “elite-driven” polarization between “oligarchical” and “popu-
list” elites.151 In 2001, the People Power II protests against Estrada’s corruption led
the military to withdraw its support, leading to Estrada’s downfall. Middle-class152
and non-ND leftist CSOs as well as the Catholic Church, capitalist oligarchs153 and tra-
ditional political elites played a key role in convening the demonstrations, illustrating
the readiness of the middle class and oligarchic elites to overturn the verdict of the
voting-majority poor.154 According to Franco, the Estrada interregnum reinforced
the development of a “fractious civil society” with “high porosity vis-à-vis an elite-
dominated political society”,155 which has been “bane and boon” for Philippine
democracy.156 Thereby, CSOs have entered into fluctuating alignments with diverse
political elites to realize their objectives, while civil society itself has been marked by
multiple internal fault lines – including quarrels over strategies157 and access to
state spoils.158
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The government of the traditional politician Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo (2001–2010)
initially enjoyed support from CSOs, and several civil society leaders joined her gov-
ernment. However, Arroyo’s corruption scandals and massive interference in the
2004 elections further undermined democratic institutions, initiating the Philippines’
first episode of democratic backsliding.159 Frustrated about their limited ability to
achieve reform under the country’s weak democratic institutions, diverse civil
society actors – including middle-class activists, ND and non-ND leftist CSOs, as
well as business and Church-based civil society leaders – supported an attempted mili-
tary coup against Arroyo in 2006.160 The government of the traditional politician
Benigno Aquino III from the Liberal Party (LP) (2010–2016) briefly ended democratic
backsliding.161 Many CSO leaders supported Aquino’s electoral campaign and held
high-ranking positions in his government.162
The 2016 elections, however, brought to power the “illiberal” populist163 Rodrigo
Duterte, who ran on a security and anti-drugs platform. Duterte’s strongest support
came from elite and middle-class voters worried about crime, corruption and systemic
disjunction, with his popularity rates peaking at around 90% in the first year of his war
on drugs (WOD).164 Duterte soon formed a diverse political coalition, including
Estrada, former LP members and political oligarchs, such as Arroyo,165 and recruited
several retired military officers into his cabinet.166 Polarization started intensifying
once Duterte began branding the followers of Aquino “incompetent and corrupt
elitists”.167
Several NGOs supported Duterte’s electoral campaign, as he promised social
reforms and pro-poor policies.168 Moreover, several ND CSO activists joined his
cabinet, assuming leading positions in the departments of social welfare, labour and
agrarian reform.169 During his campaign, Duterte had employed socialist rhetoric;170
following his election, he initiated peace talks with the CPP-NPA. This appealed to ND
CSOs, whose main goal is to dismantle the “semi-feudal”171 Philippine system. One
ND activist explained that socio-economic reforms were the “crux of the needed
change in the Philippines” and that ND activists had joined the Duterte government
to pursue such reforms.172 Conversely, critics have argued that many ND activists
joined the Duterte government to receive “transactional” benefits,173 that is, access
to state spoils.
While small sections of the NDs’ networks of lawyers and faith-based groups criti-
cized the extra-judicial killings (EJKs) of suspected drug criminals early on, most ND
CSOs remained silent where certain ND activists sat in government.174 Their reluc-
tance to break with Duterte over the EJKs damaged the legitimacy of the ND CSOs,
who had previously often been at the forefront of human rights advocacy.175
Moreover, many human rights NGOs were initially unable to issue statements
against Duterte’s abuses because many of their members sympathized with the presi-
dent. When Duterte pledged to lower the age of criminal liability to 12 years old, even
many child rights organizations failed to come up with positions because their mem-
berships were divided over the incumbent.176 The Catholic Church was likewise slow
to criticize the WOD,177 a tardiness likely related to the fact that since 2017 the presi-
dent of the Catholic Bishops’ Conference of the Philippines (CBCP) has been a friend
of Duterte from the diocese of Davao.178 In addition, the role of the Church in civil
society has been weakened by Duterte’s threats to reveal its sex and corruption scandals
as well as by death threats against leading Church officials, which the Duterte govern-
ment has done little to prevent.179
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Many non-ND leftist CSOs were “stunned by the [election] victory of Duterte”, and
long remained “not quite sure how to relate to him”.180 This points to the weakening
links between these CSOs and their local constituencies, who have often sympathized
with Duterte. Moreover, under Aquino, many non-ND leftist CSOs had engaged with
rural and urban poor communities through state development programmes, but
under Duterte “those venues [of engagement] disappeared because the program
disappeared”.181
InNovember 2017, the peace talkswith theCPP-NPA collapsed, leading to the expul-
sion of all ND activists from the government.182 Since then,Duterte has engaged in “red-
tagging”, persecuting leftist CSOs in general, and ND ones in particular.183 In 2018, the
Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC), the main national agency for regulating
CSOs, issued SEC Memorandum Circular 15 that categorizes CSOs as “low”,
“medium” or “high-risk” regarding their affinity to (communist) terrorism.184 Similarly,
the Duterte government has denounced foreign-funded CSOs as agents of the West.185
Since late 2017, civil society support for Duterte has weakened. His supporters have
become theminority inmany human rights CSOs, enabling them to criticize the govern-
ment more openly,186 while the Catholic Church has also increasingly denounced the
EJKs.187Moreover, cooperation has strengthened between diverse CSOs and the Philip-
pine Human Rights Commission (PHRC), headed by Chito Gascon, a liberal-demo-
cratic human rights activist still appointed by Aquino.188 The Commission, ND, non-
ND and more independent CSOs have collaborated on information sharing, the docu-
mentation of rights violations, human rights education and regarding advocacy.189
Moreover, individual Bishops have supported the Commission’s work and in some dio-
ceses the local social action centres of the Church, which operate under the umbrella of
the CBCP’s National Secretariat for Social Action (NASSA), have allowed the Commis-
sion to rely on their structures.190 However, the PHRC ultimately has to refer all human
rights complaints to the National Prosecutors Service (NPS), Department of Justice,
Ombudsman or to Congress, which are each dominated by Duterte loyalists.191
In spite of his authoritarian stance, Duterte remains widely popular. In 2019, pro-
Duterte candidates swept the mid-term elections, and opinion polls indicated nearly
80% popular support for the populist president.192 Accordingly, while several CSOs
have staged protests against Duterte’s human rights violations, the demonstrations
have mostly remained small and “rarely reach[ed] thousands”.193 In July 2018,
diverse CSOs, Catholic Church organizations and political-opposition groups orga-
nized the United People’s State of the Nation Address (SONA) to counter Duterte’s
official SONA. In rallies, which drew 15,000 protesters according to the police and
40,000 according to the organizers’ own estimates, CSOs criticized the WOD and
the government’s tax programme (among other things).194 However, the United
People’s SONA did not take an openly anti-Duterte stance, as many participating
CSOs could not find agreement thereon.195
Meanwhile, supporters of Duterte remain dominant on social media,196 bullying
opponents online.197 While several journalists continue to report critically about
Duterte, his government has taken legal measures against critical media outlets,
such as the Rappler198 and ABS-CBN, with the latter going off the air in May 2020.199
Accordingly, seasoned civil society leaders, including organizers of People Power I
and II, currently exclude the possibility of Duterte being ousted through popular dem-
onstrations.200 Thereby, his continuing popularity makes the manifestation of People
Power not only unlikely but also questionable in terms of ultimate legitimacy, while
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also pointing to a serious disconnect between many CSOs and their constituencies. As
a non-ND leftist organizer stated:
Killings have continued, yet he [Duterte] is so popular […].201 How do you confront an admin-
istration like Duterte[’s] who continues to have […] overwhelming support […]? And that
means a lot in terms of whether civil society organizations [can] still connect with the issues
and the concerns of the greater population.202
In sum, Philippine civil society currently remains both too fragmented and too isolated
from the popular majority to pose “an effective counterforce to Duterte”.203
Conclusion
Bangladesh, Thailand and the Philippines are among the most serious cases of demo-
cratic backsliding in Asia.204 Although the three countries are highly heterogeneous
regarding important political, economic, social, and religious features, they align in
contradicting the dominant assumption that civil society acts as an effective force
for democratic stability: CSOs have so far failed to counter democratic backsliding
in all three. This article has shown that this is largely because, already prior to the
current backsliding processes, all three constituted weak democracies in which CSOs
had long been captured by the same political elites that had also captured key demo-
cratic state institutions. This lack of autonomy has prevented civil society from acting
as an effective accountability mechanism against the power abuses committed by pol-
itical elites (paralleling a similar trend in Indonesia, as shown by Mietzner205) and
often brought the undemocratic features of CSOs to the fore. In all three countries, sig-
nificant sections of civil society initially supported the undemocratic incumbents
responsible for the current backsliding. While this tendency was especially strong in
Thailand, where the PDRC paved the way for the 2014 military coup, several CSOs
also supported the incumbent AL government in Bangladesh and the Duterte govern-
ment in the Philippines respectively. Moreover, some Bangladeshi CSOs worked with
the military-backed CTG of 2007–2008, while certain Philippine CSOs supported an
attempted coup against President Arroyo in 2006.
The combination of elite-driven political polarization and alignments between
CSOs and political elites has created deep divisions within Bangladeshi, Thai and Phi-
lippine civil society. The nature of elite-driven polarization has varied in the three cases
though, leading to differing conflicts within civil society. In Bangladesh, elites of the AL
and the BNP – parties cutting across social class – have promoted ideological polariz-
ation between secular Bengali and more religious-oriented Bangladeshi nationalism.206
This ideological conflict is mirrored in civil society, and many civil society supporters
of the AL have traditionally sympathized with the party’s Bengali nationalism. Conver-
sely, some non-party-partisan, middle-class CSO leaders supported military interven-
tion in 2007.
Thailand since the early years of the new century has experienced severe political
polarization between traditional royal, bureaucratic and military elites who advocate
“Thai-style democracy” and a capitalist elite around Thaksin that promulgates major-
itarian, “populist democracy”.207 The same ideological fault line long characterized
civil society, as exemplified by the middle-class mobilizations of the PAD and the
PDRC, which ousted populist governments that enjoyed strong electoral support
from the poor.
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In the Philippines, polarization has also pitted “oligarchic” against “populist” elites
but has remained largely non-ideological.208 Alignments among political elites as well
as between them and CSOs have been more fluid than in Bangladesh and Thailand,
with middle-class and leftist CSOs affiliating themselves with diverse populist and oli-
garchical elites to push their diverse political visions.209 In 2001, for instance, middle-
class CSOs joined oligarchical elites in mobilizing for the ousting of populist president
Estrada.210 However, current “illiberal”211 populist president Duterte secured major
electoral support from the middle class212 and assembled a broad-based political
coalition that initially included radical leftist CSOs. Moreover, in all three countries,
CSOs have sometimes aligned with political elites to gain access to state spoils.
While the specific nature of polarization thus differs in the three countries, Thai-
land, Bangladesh and the Philippines are similar in that in all three cases, less-than-
democratic incumbents have deliberately promoted polarization to gain or aggrandize
power. Moreover, in all three polarization has prompted CSOs to be “selective in the
democracy defence cases they are willing to engage in”213, as Mietzner says in reference
to Indonesia. This corresponds to Svolik’s finding that less-than-democratic incum-
bents may “draw political battle lines along societal cleavages that were [previously]
only simmering”214, with the resulting polarization leading citizens to put “partisan
interests” over “democratic principles”215, a tendency that diminishes their “ability
to resist authoritarianism”.216 Accordingly, the finding that civil society in the three
countries has been captured by political elites does not imply that CSOs have no
agency or are merely a function of elite action. Instead, CSOs have often deliberately
allowed themselves to become co-opted by different elite camps for ideological reasons
and/or to realize their political objectives.
Divisions within civil society have hindered democratic pushback by CSOs. Specifi-
cally, while in all three countries many CSOs who initially supported the current unde-
mocratic incumbents have since come to oppose them, the ongoing fragmentation of
civil society has hindered broad civil society-based opposition forming.
An important difference between the three countries is the level of popular support
for the current undemocratic incumbents, which affects the prospects for civil society
resistance. As Thompson notes, in spite of his attacks on civil liberties, populist presi-
dent Duterte has been largely successful in portraying his rule as democratically legit-
imate, owing to his electoral mandate, ongoing popularity and “legalistic” rule.
Accordingly, no broad-based civil society mobilization against his government has
occurred so far.217 Contrary to this, “coup leader-turned prime minister”218 Prayut
in Thailand lacks a popular mandate and has largely failed to legitimize democratic
rollback, which has resulted in relatively strong “pushback” against his rule.219 The
AL government in Bangladesh has no proper electoral mandate but does retain a
degree of popular support, leading to some civil society resistance in the electoral
and extra-electoral arenas.
Alternative explanations for the inability of civil society to stem democratic back-
sliding in the three countries include the latter’s relatively low levels of economic devel-
opment and other economic factors. Moreover, while the majority religion, ethnic
composition and other cultural characteristics differ in the three cases, they could
theoretically each have an impact vis-à-vis limiting civil society’s democratic potential.
However, no causal processes substantiating a clear impact of cultural factors on the
democratic potential of civil society could be found in the three cases – which is in
line with Arugay and Sinpeng’s finding that in Southeast Asia there is a “weak
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impact of structural factors [which] provides much leverage for agency-based expla-
nations of democratization outcomes”.220 Similarly, the cases yield no clear causal
mechanisms linking the less-than-democratic potential of civil society to a lack of
economic growth, corresponding to Guan’s finding that in Southeast Asia the strength
of civil society is largely unrelated to levels of economic development.221
This study has provided evidence that the middle classes in Bangladesh, Thailand
and the Philippines are “contingent democrats”,222 pointing to the intervening
impact of social inequalities and class divides, which corresponds to existing studies
on the Thai and Philippine middle classes. Specifically, the three countries’ middle
classes and their CSOs have repeatedly refused to accept elections as the only game
in town – supporting democracy only when it was in their interest to do so.223
However, I follow Arugay and Sinpeng in advocating for an agency-based approach,
as the class aspect has (co-)shaped but not defined political conflicts224 in the cases
studied. Similarly, Thompson (referring to Thailand and the Philippines) found that
the “incivility of civil society” and the middle class “can be explained by the nature
of the countries’ elite groups”.225 Nevertheless, complex social phenomena – such as
the impact of civil society on democratic development – are never monocausal, and
future research should henceforth further investigate the interrelated impacts of
social, cultural and economic factors on elite–civil society relations in backsliding
regimes.
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